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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Criminal Law and Procedure -Partial Insanity
Affecting the Degree of a Crime
Article 14 of the Louisiana Criminal Code' exempts one from
criminal responsibility on the basis of insanity only if he was
"incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong with
reference to the conduct in question,"' 2 at the time of the alleged
crime. This test embodies the right from wrong rule which pre-
cludes the use of any other test for insanity at the time of the
crime.8 This leads to the somewhat unrealistic conclusion that
criminals are either totally sane or totally insane, a position
which disregards the fact that "there are many degrees both
of sanity and insanity; and the two states approach each other
in imperceptible gradation."4
With the growth of the modern sciences of psychology and
psychiatry, dissatisfaction with the ancient right-wrong precept
has manifested itself in several new approaches to the per-
plexing defense of insanity. Those which have received the
greatest attention are the "irresistible impulse" 5 test and the
Durham "product" theory." Another approach which has been
steadily gaining recognition is that which allows consideration
to be given mental impairment of insufficient degree to fall
within the strict right-wrong test, but sufficient to negative the
specific intent necessary for the commission of certain crimes.
This is the doctrine of "partial insanity" or "diminished respon-
sibility."' 7 The rule has been characterized as simply another
1. LA. R.S. 14:14 (1950).
2. Ibid.
3. The following statements are representative of those which announce flatly
that insanity must be either a complete defense or none at all. In Commonwealth
v. Wireback, 190 Pa. St. 138, 151, 42 Atl. 542, 547 (1899), the court said:
"Either the jury remain convinced of the prisoner's sanity . . . or they are
convinced of his insanity ... ; there is no middle ground which the law recognizes."
In Kirby v. State, 68 Tex. Crim. 63, 74, 150 S.W. 455, 460 (1912), it was stated:
"[W]e have but two classes of people, the 'sane' and the 'insane.' Actual insanity,
however partial it may be, is, consequently, with us a defence, and not a mitigating
circumstance, in a prosecution for a crime."
4. 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW 90-91 (12th ed. 1932).
5. The leading case in support of this defense is Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577,
2 So. 854 (1887). See also PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 756-63 (1957).
6. Durham v. United States, 94 U.S. App. D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862 (1954).
See also PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 763-66 (1957).
7. In State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312 (1959), the Supreme Court
of New Mexico was called upon to decide the merits of the doctrine under con-
sideration. "The doctrine contended for by the defendant is sometimes referred
to as that of 'diminished' or 'partial responsibility.' This is actually a misnomer,:
and the theory may not be given an exact name. However, it means the allowing
of proof of mental derangement short of insanity as evidence of lack of deliberate!
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application of a generally accepted tenet that circumstances
may interfere with the ordinary processes of a person's mind
and render him incapable of the mental state which the law
usually infers from a given act." For example, it is well settled
that voluntary intoxication, while not a complete defense, may
be taken into consideration to show that the defendant could
not have formed the requisite specific intent necessary for the
commission of the higher grade of a crime.9
In the recent Louisiana decision of State v. Jamaes,10 the
defendant had called a qualified neuropsychiatrist to the stand,
and asked him to relate the findings and conclusions of a
psychiatric examination which he had performed on the de-
fendant prior to the trial. The defendant had not filed a special
plea of insanity but had filed only a general plea of not guilty.
The state objected to the admission of any evidence relating to
the mental condition of the defendant at the time of the crime
on the ground that no plea of insanity had been made." The
trial judge, relying on State v. Gunter, 2 and State v. Burr8
sustained the objection. On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court
affirmed the trial judge's ruling on the basis of the rule of
procedure that in the absence of a special plea of insanity timely
filed, evidence of any "mental defect" at the time of the com-
or premeditated design. In other words, it contemplates full responsibility, not
partial, but only for the crime actually committed." Id. at 292, 347 P.2d at 314.
The rule will be hereinafter referred to as the "partial insanity" rule.
8. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 177 (1954).
9. CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES 374-77 (6th ed. 1952) ; PERKINS, CRIMINAL
LAW 767-71 (1957).
10. 241 La. 233, 128 So.2d 21 (1961).
11. Another ground for the objection was that there had been no appointment
of a commission to examine the accused as to his mental condition at the time
of the crime, as authorized by LA. R.S. 15:268 (1950).
12. 208 La. 694, 702, 23 So. 2d 305, 307 (1945). In this case, the court
made the following statement with regard to the interposition of a plea of insanity
at the time of the commission of the crime when no special plea had been entered
before trial: "In the absence of a special plea setting up as a defense defendant's
insanity or mental irresponsibility, the issue of defendant's mental condition at
the time the offense was committed did not arise in this case, and the judge did
not err in excluding evidence on the issue and refusing to permit it to be sub-
mitted to the jury."
13. 237 La. 1065, 112 So. 2d 713 (1959). Here, the trial court had sustained
the state's objection to the introduction of evidence of a prior commitment of
the defendant for examination at a state mental institution, because of the absence
of a plea of insanity. The defendant argued that the evidence should have been
admitted to assist the jury in determining whether or not the defendant had the
necessary guilty knowledge or criminal intent to commit the crime charged (cattle
theft). The court quoted from the Gunter case the passage set out in note 12
aupra, and held the evidence of the prior commitment inadmissible. See also
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1958-1959 Term-Evidence,
20 LoUISIANA LAW REVIW 338 (1960).
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mission of the crime is inadmissible.1 4 Under the applicable
rules of criminal procedure, the case was correctly decided.
However, while not dealing directly with the merits of the par-
tial insanity theory, the case serves as a vehicle for discussion
of the desirability of future incorporation of the doctrine into
Louisiana law.
The basic idea upon which the partial insanity theory is
bottomed was carefully considered as early as 1863, in Stephens'
work on the Criminal Law of England. 15 Impetus was given the
growth of the rule in this country in 1881, by the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Hopt v. People, 6 in which the Court
stated the rule with regard to voluntary intoxication broadly
enough to cover mental defects:
"When a statute establishing different degrees of murder
requires deliberate premeditation in order to constitute
murder in the first degree, the question whether the accused
is in such a condition of mind, by reason of drunkenness
or otherwise, as to be incapable of deliberate premeditation,
necessarily becomes a material subject of consideration by
the jury.'1 7 (Emphasis added.)
In 1915, in the leading case of State v. Anselmo,'5 the Utah
court fully adopted the doctrine; and in 1928, New York adopted
the rule in People v. Moran.10 The United States Supreme Court
again considered the proposition in 1946, in Fisher v. United
States.2 0 The defense attempted to show that the defendant was
14. LA. R.S. 15:261, 267, 268 (1950). It is to be noted that the present
Louisiana procedure is retained in the Louisiana Law Institute's proposed revision
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The revision sets out three kinds of pleas to
the indictment at the arraignment: (1) guilty, (2) not guilty, and (3) not guilty
and not guilty by reason of insanity. The third plea raises all defenses going to
the defendant's guilt or innocence, including the special defense on the merits of
insanity at the time of the commission of the crime. All such defenses must be
tried concurrently by the jury, pursuant to the rule of State v. Dowdy, 217 La.
773, 47 So. 2d 496 (1950). Under a plea of "not guilty," evidence of insanity
at the time of the crime will be inadmissible, carrying forth the rule of the Gtunter
case. State v. Gunter, 208 La. 694, 23 So. 2d 305 (1945) ; La. Code of Criminal
Procedure Proposed Revision 16:2 (Draft March 1962).
15. STEPHEN, CRIMINAL LAw 92 (1863).
16. 104 U.S. 631 (1881).
17. Id. at 634.
18. 46 Utah 137, 148 P. 2d 1071 (1915).
19. 249 N.Y. 179, 163 N.E. 553 (1928).
20. 328 U.S. 463 (1946). Commentary on this case includes Weihofen & Over-
holser, Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree of a Crime, 56 YALE L.J. 959
(1957); Taylor, Partial Insanity as Affecting the Degree of a Crime- A Com-
mentary on Fisher v. United States, 34 CALIF. L. REv. 625 (1946) ; Note, 46
COLUM. L. REV. 1005 (1946).
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mentally incapable of forming the requisite intent, 21 but the
trial judge refused to instruct the jurors that they could take
into consideration this factor in determining the degree of the
crime. The Supreme Court affirmed the action of the trial court
in a 5-3 decision. The majority refused to force a new doctrine
of insanity upon the District of Columbia, where the case arose,
and did not express an opinion on the merits of the partial
insanity rule. Justice Murphy stated in dissent that "common
sense and logic recoil '22 at the strict application of a rule which
forbids the jury to find partially insane defendants "guilty of a
lesser degree of murder by reason of their generally weakened
or disordered intellect." 23 This decision has been viewed as
"more of a victory than a defeat" 24 for the rule since three of
the Justices were wholly favorable and the other five noncom-
mittal.
The controversy about the doctrine of partial insanity has
brought into clear focus its strengths and weaknesses. It is
said that modern science has long ago disproved the validity
of the clearcut distinction between "sane" persons and "insane"
persons which the right-wrong test necessitates. 25 The argument
most often advanced is that it is wholly illogical to permit intoxi-
cation and provocation to reduce the degree of a crime and to
exclude mental defect as such a consideration. 26 It is also felt
that such a rule would be more in accord with modern penologi-
cal theories, which call for a tailoring of the punishment to the
criminal rather than to the crime.27 And the extremely prag-
matic argument is made that the sympathetic jury often acquits
the defendant when faced only with the alternatives of acquittal
or undue punishment.28 As a result, many mental defectives
may be released sooner than is desirable.
21. The defendant was shown to be a person of "psychopathic personality
[and] predominantly aggressive type of behavior" who impulsively struck his
superior with a piece of wood, killing her. Brief for the United States, p. 89,
Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
22. 328 U.S. 463, 492 (1946).
23. Ibid.
24. Weihofen & Overholser, Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree of a Crime,
56 YALE L.J. 959, 961 (1957).
25. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 768 (1957) ; WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS
A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 177 (1954) ; WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAw 91 (12th ed. 1932) ;
WHITE, INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 89 (1923); Keedy, Insanity and
Criminal Responsibility, 30 HARv. L. REV. 535 (1917) ; Weihofen & Overholser,
Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree of a Crime, 56 YALE L.J. 959 (1957) ; Note,
79 U. PA. L. REv. 209 (1930).
26. See, e.g., Taylor, Partial Insanity as Affecting the Degree of Crime - A
Commentary on Fisher v. United States, 34 CALIF. L. REV. 625, 634 (1946).
27. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 177 (1954).
28. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 492 (1946), Murphy, J., dissenting.
1962]
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Several objections have been advanced. One attack is based
on the difficulty which the jury will encounter in these "border-
line cases." Fear has been expressed that the operation of the
rule would lead to the establishment of a "barometric scale of
insanity. '29  This criticism is not convincing since the only
"scale" involved is that which divides crimes into degrees.80 The
analogies drawn by those who favor the rule, between intoxica-
tion, provocation, and partial insanity, are criticized on the basis
that the former two arise out of objective facts, whereas a
mental defect is a purely subjective condition, examination of
which tends to confuse juries.81 A practical consideration, which
brings into sight the far-reaching effect of the change to a par-
tial insanity test, is the objection that if the test were extended
to crimes other than murder, many partially insane criminals
would receive short prison terms and be released from custody
sooner than many sane and less dangerous criminals.32 The
only answer to this objection lies in the addition of some pro-
vision for the treatment as well as punishment of the partially
insane.88 When this aspect of the doctrine is fully considered,
it may be seen that it goes to the "very foundation of our penal
philosophy [and] concept of responsibility." 84
Of the states to which the doctrine has been presented, it has
been estimated that at least eleven have adopted it, and that
at least four have rejected it.85 The courts in some other juris-
29. Note, 30 HAIRv. L. REV. 179, 180 (1930).
30. Weihofen, Partial Insanity and Criminal Intent, 24 ILL. L. REV. 505, 523
(1930).
31. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 771 (1957) ; WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS
A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 187 (1954) ; Taylor, Partial Insanity as Affecting the
Degree of a Crime- A Commentary on Fisher v. United States, 34 CALIF. L. REV.
625, 632 (1946) ; Weihofen & Overholser, Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree
of a Crime, 56 YALE L.J. 959, 976 (1957). A refutation to this objection is found
in the dissenting opinion in Fisher v. United States: "[J]uries constantly must
judge the baffling psychological factors of deliberation and premeditation, Con-
gress having entrusted the ascertainment of those factors to the good sense of
juries. It seems senseless to shut the door on the assistance which medicine and
psychiatry can give in this regard to these matters, however inexact and incom-
plete that assistance may presently be. Precluding the consideration of mental
deficiency only makes the jury's decision on deliberation and premeditation less
intelligent and trustworthy." 328 U.S. 463, 493 (1946), Murphy, J., dissenting.
32. Weihofen, Partial Insanity and Criminal Intent, 24 ILL. L. REV. 505, 526
(1930).
33. Ibid.
34. Id. at 527.
35. There is some variance in the estimates of the current status of the rule
by jurisdictions. The estimate adopted here is that of the Supreme Court of New
Mexico set forth. in State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 292, 347 P.2d 312, 314 (1959) :
"Throughout the United States, the problem has arisen in a great many jurisdic-
tions, and it appears that at least eleven jurisdictions approve of the doctrine
contended for by the defendant. These are California, Colorado, Connecticut.
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-dictions have used language in intoxication cases, similar to that
•used in Hopt, broad enough to include mental defects as well as
effects of intoxication."
A tentative draft of the American Law Institute's Model
Penal Code includes a very succinct statement of a rule which
could lend needed flexibility to the insanity defense. It provides:
"Section 4.02. Evidence of Mental Disease or Defect Admis-
sible When Relevant to Element of the Offense. (1) Evidence
that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect
shall be admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the
defendant did or did not have a state of mind which is an
element of the offense. 87
Article 10(1) of the Louisiana Criminal Code"8 defines spe-
cific criminal intent as "that state of mind which exists when
the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the
prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to
act."89 Where the accused is able to prove that he was incapable
of forming this specific criminal intent due to a mental defect,
such proof should not be precluded. If the essential element of
specific intent is found lacking upon consideration of such evi-
dence, commission of the particular crime requiring this element
is a legal impossibility. Admission of such evidence should not
be inhibited by a restrictive substantive right-wrong rule of
criminal law4 which is rapidly losing its utility in a complex
Indiana, Nebraska, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
Whereas at least four jurisdictions have apparently rejected the theory. These
states are Arizona, Idaho, Missouri, and Nevada. Several other jurisdictions, with-
out enumerating them, have not squarely passed upon the question, although five
apparently approve of the doctrine and three possibly reject it."
36. Johnson v. State, 24 So.2d 228 (Ala. App. 1945) ; People v. Brisbane, 295
Ill. 241, 129 N.E. 185 (1920) ; Spencer v. State, 69 Md. 28, 13 At. 809 (1888)
People v. Walker, 38 Mich. 156 (1878) ; State v. Garvey, 11 Minn. 154 (1866).
37. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(1) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955). The com-
ment to this article is sufficiently pertinent to be set out here in full: "1. Para-
graph (1) resolves an issue as to which there is a sharp division of authority
throughout the country. Some jurisdictions decline for reasons of policy to accord
to evidence of mental disease or defect an admissibility co-extensive with its rele-
vancy to prove or disprove a material state of mind. See e.g. Fisher v. United
States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946). We see no justification for a limitation of this kind.
If states of mind such as deliberation or premeditation are accorded legal sig-
nificance, psychiatric evidence should be admissible when relevant to prove or
disprove their existence to the same extent as any other relevant evidence."
38. LA. R.S. 14:10(1) (1950).
39. Ibid.
40. Another argument for the admission of such evidence may be advanced
along procedural lines, as opposed to that set out in the text having to do with
the substantive definition of "legal insanity." Article 261 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure lists four kinds of pleas to an indictment: (1) guilty, (2) not guilty,
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXII
society in which psychiatric and psychological developments are
leading to greater understanding of the insane and partially
insane. Modern penological techniques are aimed at greater in-
dividualism of punishment and it seems in keeping with these
advances in penology that the law continue its revision of the
insanity defense in conformity with recognized advances in
psychiatry and other sciences.
James A. George
(3) former jeopardy, and (4) insanity. The rules of criminal procedure discussed
in such cases as the Gunter and Burr cases, supra, deal specifically with the in-
sanity of the defendant at the time of commission of the alleged crime. It would
seem that the defendant should be able to claim that he was unable to form the
specific intent because of a mental defect under a simple plea of not guilty, just
as he is able to assert any other reason for the absence of this requisite intent
under such a plea. It would further appear that the rules formulated for the intro-
duction of evidence of insanity at the time of the alleged crime should be held to
apply only where the defendant contends that he is wholly exempt from criminal
responsibility because of insanity, and not where he is seeking to have a mental
defect, short of insanity, considered as bearing on his ability to form a specific
intent. Were this procedure followed by the courts, the definition of "legal in-
sanity" set out in Article 14 of the Louisiana Criminal Code would not operate
to restrict the admission of evidence of mental defect, in the absence of a special
plea of insanity.
